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IGNOU MEC 101 Assignment 2023-24 Question Paper
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1. a. A monopolist uses one input X, which she purchases at the fixed price p=5 in order to produce output q. Her demand and production functions are: P=85-3q and q= 2×1/2 respectively. Derive the equilibrium output and equilibrium profit.
b. “In real world, sometimes it is not possible to achieve optimum welfare.” Comment
and discuss the obstacles in attaining Pareto optimum.
2. Given a Cobb-Douglas utility function
U (X, Y) = X1/2 Y1/2, Where X and y are the two goods that a consumer consumes at per unit prices of Px and Py respectively. Assuming the income of the consumer to be ₹M, determine:
a. Marshallian demand function for goods X and Y.
b. Indirect utility function for such a consumer.
c. The maximum utility attained by the consumer where α =1/2, Px =₹ 2, Py = ₹ 8 and M= ₹ 4000.
d. Derive Roy’s identity.
Answer the following questions in about 400 words each.
3. a.) How is Cournot’s model of oligopoly different from Bertrand’s model of oligopoly?
b.) Suppose the demand for a product is given by p=d (q)=−0.8q+150 and the supply for the same product is given by p=s(q)=5.2q
For both functions, q is the quantity and p is the price. Find out producer surplus and
consumer surplus.
4. a.) Differentiate between Cooperative and non-cooperative game theory.
b.) From the following pay-off matrix, determine:
(i) The optimal strategy for each individual.
(ii) Value of the game.
Player 1
Player 2
Strategies I II III IV V
I 9 3 1 8 0
II 6 5 4 6 7
III 2 4 3 3 8
IV 5 6 2 2 1
5. a.) Do you agree that by paying higher than the minimum wage, employers can retain
skilled workers, increase productivity, or ensure loyalty? Comment on the statement in
the light of efficiency wage model.
b.) There are two firms 1 and 2 in an industry, each producing output Q1 and Q2
respectively and facing the industry demand given by P=50-2Q, where P is the market
price and Q represents the total industry output, that is Q= Q1 + Q2. Assume that the cost function is C = 10 + 2q. Solve for the Cournot equilibrium in such an industry.
6. a.) Do you think that a risk-averse individual gamble or will a risk lover purchase insurance? Explain your answer.
b) Radha has assets worth 10,000 rupees and is facing a loss of 3,600 with a probability of 0.002. She is indifferent between paying G rupees for insurance protection and assuming the risk of loss personally. She values total assets of amount w≥0 according to the utility function u (w) = w1/2. Determine G.
7. Write short notes on following:
a) Different types of price discrimination
b) Bilateral monopoly
c) Economies of Scale
d) Pooling and separating equilibrium
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